A question of money by Vanessa Sumo
I
n its early days, the Bank of England used a weather
vane to predict when commercial ships would arrive at
the port of London. Variable winds on the river Thames
made docking times uncertain, causing sudden shifts in the
demand for money and credit. But with the weather vane’s
guidance, central bankers could overcome this uncertainty
and wield more prudent control over the quantity of money
in the economy.
Such a gauge would be useful today. Central bankers find
the link between money and inflation to be fickle in practice.
This is partly because the definition of money has been evolv-
ing along with the financial landscape. Ideally, central bankers
would like to predict shifts in the demand for money that
people use to purchase goods and services. But financial
deregulation and innovation has allowed banks, for instance,
to create new types of products. This has blurred the line
between what is “transactions” money and what is not. And
so it has become harder to pin down money demand.
Central bankers all over the world, including the Federal
Reserve, often give this reason as to why they have paid
increasingly scarce attention to money when conducting
monetary policy. Indeed, The Economist noted in 2006 that
former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan did not mention the
word “money” in 10 speeches. His successor, Ben Bernanke,
however, did talk about money in a speech at a European
Central Bank conference late last year, but only to confirm
that “monetary and credit aggregates have not played a central
role in the formulation of U.S. monetary policy” since the
monetarist experiment that brought down inflation under
Paul Volcker more than a quarter of a century ago. 
Is money still relevant for monetary policy? It might
seem odd that money does not occupy a more prominent
place. After all, Milton Friedman’s proposition that 
“inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenome-
non” is widely accepted as a general principle, with some
qualifications — which would suggest that the key to stabi-
lizing inflation is to control the growth of money. As Mervyn
King, the Governor of the Bank of England, asks, “How do
we explain the apparent contradiction that the acceptance
of the idea that inflation is a monetary phenomenon has
been accompanied by the lack of any reference to money in
the conduct of monetary policy?” The paradox is that as 
central banks recognize price stability as their main objec-
tive, they seem to be giving a smaller role to money. This is
nowhere more apparent than in central banks’ principal
choice of a policy instrument.
Instruments and Rules
Achieving price and output stability is the main objective of
central banks, but these are not the variables that they can
directly control. Rather, central banks operate through 
targets and instruments to reach their ultimate objectives.
Insofar as there is a reliable relationship between instru-
ments and goals, central banks can tweak their instruments
to achieve their desired impact on the economy.
Most central banks prefer to use interest rates as an
instrument through which they can carry out monetary 
policy. For instance, the Fed’s Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) sets the fed funds rate, its policy
instrument of choice. Depending on its outlook of the 
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times a year to raise, lower, or keep the
fed funds rate constant. 
But the interest rate is not the only
instrument that central banks can 
use. They can also opt to control the
quantity of money circulating in 
the economy. In other words, central
banks can either choose to set the
quantity of money or set the price of
holding money; that is, the interest
rate. Thus, fixing the interest rate
means that the amount of money
would have to adjust in response to the
level of the interest rate. Likewise, if
central banks decide to control money,
then they would have to let the 
interest rate fluctuate as it will. Under
certain conditions, these may not be
equivalent strategies. 
The classic 1970 analysis by
William Poole, president of the 
St. Louis Fed, shows us that if the cen-
tral bank has to choose a policy
instrument before observing the 
disturbances to the goods and money
markets, then setting either the inter-
est rate or the stock of money can 
lead to smaller output fluctuations —
variability in gross domestic product
— depending on the type of shocks
that are present. If there is an aggre-
gate demand shock (say, a huge
increase in government spending),
then fixing the interest rate will lead to
larger output fluctuations than con-
trolling money supply and letting the
interest rate rise, which automatically
stabilizes output. On the other hand,
if the demand for money is unruly (as
explained earlier), then fixing the
stock of money can lead to more
volatile interest rates and larger output
fluctuations, such that keeping the
interest rate constant is more desirable.
Along with these debates on the
choice of a monetary policy instru-
ment were discussions on whether
monetary policy would be better
served by following a rule (to set the
money supply or the interest rate) or
to allow the central bank’s discretion.
Policy rules have the advantage of
being easily understood by the public,
so that they can hold the central 
bank accountable for its decisions.
Friedman, for instance, advocated
adhering to a “money rule”: a proposal
to increase the stock of money by a
fixed percentage each month (corre-
sponding to the growth in long-run
output). His preference for a rule-
based policy was founded on the
observation that there is a lengthy
interval from measuring current 
economic conditions to implementing
policy to affecting the public’s borrow-
ing and spending decisions. By the
time the policy takes effect, the discre-
tionary response may no longer be
appropriate. In this way, Friedman
thought that simply sticking to a
money rule rather than exercising 
discretion could do less harm to 
the economy.
But the policy rules that are dis-
cussed these days are “activist” rules
rather than constant rate of growth
rules like Friedman’s. Activist rules can
be expressed in terms of a formula,
which describes how the value of a pol-
icy instrument adjusts or “feeds back”
in response to economic conditions. 
Central banks can use both rules
and discretion to varying degrees, and
even if some would appear to lean
more toward discretion (including,
arguably, the Fed), rules play a promi-
nent role not only as a guide to
discretion but also as a benchmark for
outsiders to use when thinking about
the central bank’s monetary policy
stance. And because monetary policy
has evolved over the years such that
the interest rate has become the 
preferred instrument, the choice of
rules has likewise tilted in favor of
interest rate rules and away from
money growth rules. 
Measure for Measure
In 1993, John Taylor of Stanford
University formulated a policy rule
that closely approximated the Fed’s
policy actions over several years. The
Taylor rule has become very well-
known, in part because it specifies a
short-term interest rate and so makes
it easy to compare with the Fed’s 
actual policy stance. The Taylor rule
prescribes a nominal interest rate, in
this case the fed funds rate, which
reflects movements around a long-run
real interest rate depending on how
much actual inflation and output 
deviate from their respective targets. 
While the central bank chooses a
target rate for inflation, the output
“target” is determined by economic
fundamentals, such as productivity
and population growth. This “feed-
back rule” is designed in such a way
that if actual inflation and output are
above their desired levels, the fed
funds rate should be raised in order to
dampen these inflationary forces. The
bigger the gap between actual infla-
tion and output and their targets, the
higher the fed funds rate and 
the tighter monetary policy should be. 
Several years before the Taylor rule,
Bennett McCallum, an economist at
Carnegie Mellon University and a 
visiting scholar at the Richmond Fed,
devised a rule that is often used along-
side Taylor’s to track the Fed’s
monetary policy stance. Unlike the
Taylor rule, which sets the nominal
interest rate, the McCallum rule 
specifies a growth rate for base money,
which is typically the amount of 
currency plus commercial bank
reserves kept at the central bank. By
prescribing how much the base money
should rise or fall, a central bank is able
to influence the stock of money in 
the financial system.
Base money, according to this
“monetarist” rule, should expand as
fast as the desired growth in nominal
income — similar to Friedman’s policy
prescription — and adjust for devia-
tions of actual income growth from
this preferred rate. For instance, if
nominal income is moving sluggishly,
then the base money should be
allowed to grow faster in order to 
stimulate the economy. Thus, while
the Taylor rule feeds back from devia-
tions of output and inflation from its
targets, the McCallum rule feeds back
from movements away from the
desired path of nominal income.
Because the McCallum rule is a
“money rule,” the conventional 
wisdom has been that rules like
Taylor’s are better able to capture the
practice of well-run interest-rate-
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Fed. This is not necessarily accurate. 
Using Greenspan’s tenure at the
helm of the Fed as a benchmark for a
successful period of monetary policy,
McCallum has compared how close
the policy prescriptions of the two
rules are to the actual fed funds rate
set by the Fed and the actual base
money growth. In a note for the
Shadow Open Market Committee, a
group of economists who meet regu-
larly to evaluate the policy choices of
the Fed, McCallum finds that “actual
policy during the Greenspan era has
not differed from that recommended
by the McCallum rule by a significantly
greater extent than is the case for the
Taylor rule.”
If the same exercise is used to gauge
the tightness or looseness of a central
bank’s monetary policy, then the two
rules have been giving different per-
spectives over the last four years. In
the St. Louis Fed’s Monetary Trends
report, which regularly tracks the set-
tings prescribed by the two rules (see
above), the Taylor rule has for several
years suggested that monetary 
policy has been too loose while the
McCallum rule has suggested that
monetary policy has been too tight,
assuming that the Fed has set an
implicit 2 percent inflation target.
However, the McCallum base money
growth rate has been closer to the
actual values. (Some observers would
say that the fall in global real interest
rates means that the real interest rate
indicated in the Taylor rule — 2 per-
cent — should be adjusted downward,
which would allow it to come closer to
the actual fed funds rate.)
Another way to compare the two
rules is to look at points in history
when central banks may have followed
a policy that was either too loose or
too tight. For instance, both rules cor-
rectly suggest that monetary policy
was much too loose in the United
States during the great inflation of the
1970s. However, there were episodes
when the base money rule was 
dropping the “right” hints while 
the interest rate rule was not. “I think
money growth rules give better signals
as to what needs to be done,” 
says McCallum in an interview. 
For instance, monetary policy at the
Bank of Japan may have been too
loose during the asset price bubble of
the late 1980s, which the McCallum
rule correctly calls. The Taylor rule, on 
the other hand, indicated that policy
was too tight or about right during
that period. But McCallum recog-
nizes that the evidence in favor 
of money growth rules is not com-
pletely decisive. “It’s not an easy
argument to make and not all good
monetary economists agree with it,”
says McCallum.
Nevertheless, McCallum’s base
money growth rule seems to perform
well, and can give “ideal” policy 
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even sometimes better than Taylor’s
interest rate rule. Still, why do central
banks favor interest rates over money
as a policy instrument? The instability
in the demand for money and how
accurately money is defined is one 
reason, but there are others. Central
banks may prefer to smooth interest
rates, thus making it quite natural for
them to use the interest rate as a policy
instrument. Commercial banks, for
instance, dislike interest rate variability
because it can wreak havoc on the
value of their assets if interest rates
move sharply up and down. “Central
bankers spend a lot of time in the 
company of bankers, and they want 
to keep the financial market happy,”
says McCallum.
Central banks may also have a 
better understanding than before of
how to adjust interest rates in a timely
way. “We have a much better apprecia-
tion of what disciplined discretionary
monetary policy is today,” says
Laurence Meyer, a former Federal
Reserve Board governor, who is now
an economist at the consulting firm
Macroeconomic Advisers. 
In the 1970s, monetarists argued
that the Fed needed to move away
from its practice of setting the fed
funds rate because it was doing a bad
job of judging where the interest rate
should be in order to bring down 
inflation. Hence, it would be better to
target the supply of money. But
because of the important lessons
learned from that period of high 
inflation, central bankers have much
more confidence today in their 
ability to conduct monetary policy by
choosing the right level of interest
rates. And to the extent that central
banks prefer to smooth interest rates, 
then they don’t need to abandon 
their instrument of choice. “I think 
they’ve reached a better compromise
between the desirability of avoiding
interest rate volatility and the 
desirability of making sure interest
rates move up and down when they
need to for economic stability,” says
Edward Nelson, an economist at the
St. Louis Fed.
Follow the Money
The Fed under Paul Volcker was 
successful in orchestrating an end to
the high and erratic inflation of 
the 1970s, largely because it paid
attention to the band of monetarists
who said that the central bank could
do something about it. It might 
seem odd then that money no longer
plays a leading role in monetary 
policy today, as if the Fed were 
risking the possibility of a return to
runaway inflation.  
Does abandoning an emphasis on
money mean that the Fed has forgot-
ten the lessons learned from that
period? Michael Woodford, an 
economist at Columbia University,
thinks otherwise. “I would argue that
the most important of these lessons,
and the ones that are of continuing rel-
evance to the conduct of policy today,
are not dependent on the thesis of the
importance of monetary aggregates,”
Woodford said in his remarks at a
European Central Bank conference
late last year. 
Monetarists made it clear that cen-
tral banks could contain inflation, as
opposed to the prevailing view at that
time that inflation was largely a prod-
uct of too much power being wielded
by labor unions demanding higher
wages and monopolist producers
demanding higher prices. They also
emphasized the importance of a 
commitment to a policy rule that
would foster credibility and anchor
inflation expectations. On both counts,
however, Woodford emphasizes that
adhering to a money growth target is
not the only way to bring down infla-
tion and not the only kind of
commitment that a central bank can
make. Central banks that have set an
explicit inflation target, for instance,
bind themselves to a specific numeri-
cal target and justify this course of
action to the public. And though the
Fed has no such explicit targets, it
often speaks persuasively about its
commitment to price stability, and its
performance since the early 1980s has
made these statements very credible.
But perhaps the biggest blow to the
case for money is that it has been eased
out of today’s consensus model for
understanding how monetary policy
affects the economy. It used to be that
economists and central bankers
thought of money as the instrument
that influences aggregate spending
decisions and subsequently inflation,
the interest rate being determined by
the demand and supply of money in the
money market. In the new consensus
model, however, an interest rate rule of
the type proposed by Taylor has
replaced the money market. In other
words, the amount of money in 
the system is now determined by the
interest rate and not the other way
around, rendering money essentially
superfluous in this model.
Money may not be everything, but
has it become completely dispensable?
Or is it still worthwhile to track the
growth of money, even in some 
supporting role? “I’ve come to believe
that the right thing to do is to think of
monetary aggregates as an indicator,
but not necessarily use it as the
[instrument] that the Fed sets from
week to week,” says McCallum. 
While Laurence Meyer was at the
Board of Governors, he made it a 
practice to meet with money specialists
on the staff before every FOMC meet-
ing. He thought that looking at the
behavior of money was a worthwhile
cross-check for any signals about future
macroeconomic developments which
other data may not have picked up.
However, he often walked away empty-
handed. “In five-and-a-half years, I
never got anything out of that meeting
that would have altered my views about
monetary policy,” says Meyer.
Still, McCallum thinks that it is
unwise to ignore money. “It’s got 
better information than the interest
rates for central banks,” he says.
Nelson likewise agrees that money
could be a good indicator. For
instance, if money growth is rising but
the interest rate is kept unchanged
(because the central bank sets 
the interest rate), then the central
bank has to print more money just 
to keep the interest rate constant. 
But why has the central bank 
needed to print more money? 
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future income or future inflation have
increased, so people are building up
their money holdings. “That’s a change
in the economy … that you wouldn’t
see just by looking at interest 
rates,” says the St. Louis Fed’s 
Nelson. More generally, the amount 
of money may be influenced by the
prices of an entire range of assets 
and the interest rate is just 
one price, so money may reveal 
additional information about people’s
spending decisions. 
For McCallum and other mone-
tarists, money may still make the
world go around, but they’ve come to
hold a more pragmatic view. “Central
banks use interest rates rules, so we
want to converse with them. John
Taylor’s paper was very helpful … It’s
healthy for academics to talk to cen-
tral banks,” says McCallum. Even
some of McCallum’s own work reflects
the current state of affairs. 
With respect to monetary policy
practice, Fed Chairman Bernanke
believes that it may be “unwise” to rely
heavily on money as a guide to 
policy in the United States. But he also 
thinks that “money growth may 
contain important information 
about future economic develop-
ments,” enough so that the Fed will
probably continue to keep an eye on
money growth.  RF
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